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Notes 
FURTHERING DECOLONIZATION: JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF COLONIAL CRIMINAL LAWS 
MARYAM KANNA† 
ABSTRACT 
  Most of the world today was once colonized by a European power. 
Great Britain was one of the most prolific colonizers, with more than 
412 million people under its rule at its height. As part of its colonial 
enterprise, Great Britain transplanted criminal laws into its colonies 
and territories, to varying degrees. Across many former 
Commonwealth colonies, the criminal codes implemented by the 
British were similar or even identical. Today, these colonial criminal 
codes remain largely intact in many former colonies. Some of these 
colonial criminal laws are notoriously used by modern postcolonial 
governments to infringe human rights and restrict constitutional 
freedoms. While these laws have sometimes been challenged in court, 
they are often upheld despite their troublesome impact. 
  These laws are colonial holdovers, persisting in modern, 
postcolonial societies despite their anachronistic and foreign origins. 
As formerly colonized states continue the process of decolonization, 
their courts should assess a law’s colonial origin when considering its 
validity under the native constitution. This Note contends that courts 
across the former British Empire can operationalize consideration of a 
law’s colonial origin as an element of formal judicial review through a 
means-end proportionality test. Through a discussion of two types of 
proportionality—sequential and nonsequential—and their application 
to sodomy and sedition laws in three former British colonies—
Malaysia, Kenya, and briefly, India—this Note demonstrates how 
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proportionality can equip constitutional courts to further the national 
process of decolonization and the pursuit of self-determination. 
INTRODUCTION  
“They were wrong then, and they are wrong now.”1 At the 2018 
convening of the Commonwealth2 heads of government, Prime 
Minister Theresa May apologized to more than fifty leaders from 
across the former British Empire for her country’s colonial imposition 
of antigay sodomy laws.3 May elaborated, saying she “deeply 
regret[ted] both the fact that such laws were introduced and the legacy 
of discrimination, violence and death that persists today.”4 May’s 
statements reflect a growing awareness of the enduring mark British 
colonialism has left on the world. That mark is particularly distinct in 
Asian, African, and American nations, the majority of which were 
colonized by European powers well into the twentieth century.5 Relics 
of colonialism remain in many facets of postcolonial society. Codified 
in penal codes around the world, holdovers like sodomy laws are 
among the most obvious.6 Indeed, Prime Minister May’s remarks 
demonstrate how these laws often restrict constitutional freedoms and 
international human rights,7 but they nevertheless persist in many 
 
 1. Pippa Crerar, Theresa May Says She Deeply Regrets Britain’s Legacy of Anti-Gay Laws, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2018, 8:22 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/17/theresa-
may-deeply-regrets-britain-legacy-anti-gay-laws-commonwealth-nations-urged-overhaul-legislation  
[https://perma.cc/J7RS-P2PY]. 
 2. The Commonwealth of Nations is the voluntary association of fifty-four states, almost all 
of which are former colonies and territories of the British Empire. About Us, COMMONWEALTH, 
https://thecommonwealth.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/XT7D-UJHH]. 
 3. Crerar, supra note 1.  
 4. Lizzy Buchan, Theresa May Urges Commonwealth Countries To Reform ‘Outdated’ 
Homosexuality Laws, INDEP. (Apr. 17, 2018, 10:57 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/politics/theresa-may-commonwealth-homosexuality-laws-lgbt-rights-africa-caribbean-
a8308256.html [https://perma.cc/XBV5-5D7R].  
 5. See Max Fisher, Map: European Colonialism Conquered Every Country in the World but 
These Five, VOX (Feb. 24, 2015, 10:24 AM), https://www.vox.com/2014/6/24/5835320/map-in-the-
whole-world-only-these-five-countries-escaped-european [https://perma.cc/X8P5-WSNB] (illustrating 
the extent of European colonization from the 1500s to the 1960s). 
 6. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, THIS ALIEN LEGACY: THE ORIGINS OF “SODOMY” LAWS 
IN BRITISH COLONIALISM 4–5 (2008) [hereinafter HUM. RTS. WATCH, THIS ALIEN LEGACY], 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/lgbt1208_webwcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CWX-
9V7X] (“[Half of the] 80 countries [that] still criminalize consensual homosexual conduct between 
adult men, and often between adult women . . . have these laws because they once were British 
colonies.”).  
 7. Cf. DAVID M. ANDERSON & DAVID KILLINGRAY, POLICING THE EMPIRE: 
GOVERNMENT, AUTHORITY AND CONTROL, 1830-1940, at 1 (1991) (studying colonial policing to 
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Commonwealth nations8 and are often upheld by courts when 
challenged.9 
Although judges rarely scrutinize a law’s colonial legacy, some 
examples exist. In a landmark decision, the Caribbean Court of Justice 
(“CCJ”) overturned the mandatory death penalty in Barbados, a 
former British colony, in part based on the law’s colonial origins and 
its fundamental inconsistency with international human rights.10 In that 
case, the government argued the Barbadian Constitution’s “savings 
clause”11 protected colonial holdovers, like the mandatory death 
penalty, from judicial review. The Court dismissed this argument 
outright, refusing to “frustrate the basic underlying principles that the 
Constitution is the supreme law and that the judiciary is 
independent.”12 Instead, the Court resolved to “ensur[e] that the laws 
conform to the supreme law of the Constitution and are not calcified 
to reflect the colonial times.”13 
Most scholarship in this area falls into one of two groups. One 
group focuses on these laws’ problematic human rights implications—
mainly using colonial legacy to emphasize the laws’ alien and 
anachronistic nature—without explicitly focusing on constitutional 
doctrine or judicial review.14 The second group focuses on 
 
demonstrate “the establishment and maintenance of authority [that] lie at the very heart of the 
historiography of empire”). 
 8. See ENZE HAN & JOSEPH O’MAHONEY, BRITISH COLONIALISM AND THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY 2 (2018) (noting that, in 2018, thirty-eight of the 
seventy-two countries criminalizing sodomy were once under British rule). 
 9. See, e.g., EG v. Att’y Gen. (2019) K.L.R. 1, 33–56 (H.C.K.) (Kenya), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/ 
cases/view/173946 [https://perma.cc/6VRQ-DGAL] (upholding Kenya’s sodomy law). 
 10. See Nervais v. The Queen, [2018] CCJ 19 (AJ) at 3–32, 47–48 (Barb.), https://ccj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/2018-CCJ-19-AJ-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7BK-HEA7] (holding Barbados’s 
mandatory death penalty law unconstitutional). 
 11. Savings clauses, a feature of some Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions, “grandfather 
in” pre-existing colonial laws into post-independence constitutional documents. See generally 
Margaret A. Burnham, Saving Constitutional Rights from Judicial Scrutiny: The Savings Clause in 
the Law of the Commonwealth Caribbean, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 249 (2005) 
(describing the historical development of savings clauses in former British colonies in the 
Caribbean).  
 12. Nervais, [2018] CCJ 19 (AJ) at 25. 
 13. Id. at 28.  
 14. See, e.g., Michael Kirby, The Sodomy Offence: England’s Least Lovely Criminal Law 
Export?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND GENDER IDENTITY IN THE 
COMMONWEALTH: STRUGGLES FOR DECRIMINALISATION AND CHANGE 61, 65–66 (Corrine 
Lennox & Matthew Waites eds., 2013) (ebook) (detailing the historic implementation of sodomy 
laws and other penal laws in former British colonies); E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as 
Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1533–39 (2019) [hereinafter Achiume, Migration as 
Decolonization] (arguing that damaging colonial and neocolonial influences have perpetuated the 
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constitutional courts and doctrinal reform in Commonwealth nations 
but only mentions colonialism in passing or merely notes its general 
influence on the postcolonial legal system.15 This Note unites these two 
areas of literature and seeks to spark new inquiries into constitutional 
doctrinal reform. It argues that critiques of colonial influence should 
be an operationalized element of postcolonial constitutional review. 
As part of a means-end proportionality test, constitutional courts in 
formerly colonized states should consider a law’s colonial origins as a 
factor weighing in favor of its invalidation. To make the argument, this 
Note focuses on colonial holdovers in the penal codes of 
Commonwealth of Nations member states.16 Because these codes are 
among the most tangible and persistent institutions of British colonial 
control, they are an appropriate illustration of how colonial influence 
should factor into constitutional review.17  
 
historic subordination of peoples from the “Third World” in international migration law); Varsha 
Chitnis & Danaya Wright, Legacy of Colonialism: Law and Women’s Rights in India, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1315, 1348 (2007) (reasoning that the women’s rights movement in India is 
hindered by the “inherent patriarchal and colonial underpinnings of many of [India’s] gender-
based laws”); Simon Coldham, Criminal Justice Policies in Commonwealth Africa: Trends and 
Prospects, 44 J. AFR. L. 218, 220 (2000) (describing reliance by African courts on “unAfrican 
forms of punishment” imposed during the British colonial era). 
 15. See generally, e.g., Laurence Juma & Chuks Okpaluba, Judicial Intervention in Kenya’s 
Constitutional Review Process, 11 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 287 (2012) (arguing that 
judicial organs should do a better job of “nurtur[ing]” constitutional documents in order to 
promote stability and greater constitutionalism); H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial 
Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239 
(2006) (analyzing constitutionalism and judicial review in modern Africa, Professor Prempeh 
discusses the influence of colonialism generally but does not focus on colonial remnants in legal 
codes); Li-ann Thio, Beyond the “Four Walls” in an Age of Transnational Judicial Conversations: 
Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudication in Malaysia and Singapore, 19 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 428 (2006) (studying judicial review in Malaysian and Singaporean courts 
without mentioning the colonial influence on the modern legal systems in either—both nations 
are former British colonies). 
 16. This Note focuses on the former colonies of Great Britain because of its status as a 
particularly prolific colonial power. At the British Empire’s height in the nineteenth century, 
more than 412 million people were under British control all over Asia, Africa, and the Americas. 
See AGNUS MADDISON, OECD, THE WORLD ECONOMY: A MILLENNIAL PERSPECTIVE 97 
(2001) (describing the British Empire at its zenith, when it contained ten times as many people as 
Great Britain itself).  
 17. While some forms of British colonial control featured semi-autonomy, as in the case of 
“white settler colonies” like Australia and Canada, see HAN & O’MAHONEY, supra note 8, at 10–
11 (noting the existence of British protectorates and self-governing colonies where attributing the 
criminalization of homosexual conduct to the British is less plausible), this Note focuses on case 
studies “in which British colonial administrators had formal legal authority” through the 
imposition of complete criminal codes, see id. at 10.  
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This Note is divided into four parts. Part I first reviews legal 
critiques of colonialism, drawing mainly from the area of human rights 
law, and describes the growing judicial consciousness of these critiques. 
Then, it analyzes Great Britain’s influence on the penal codes of many 
Commonwealth nations, paying particular attention to sodomy laws 
and sedition laws.  
Parts II and III argue for a doctrinal modification to 
Commonwealth judicial review that recalibrates existing 
proportionality tests to factor in the origins and original purposes of 
colonial criminal laws. Each Part considers one of two related, but 
operationally distinct, proportionality tests.18 Part II explains the 
sequential proportionality test and explores its use in Malaysia, where 
courts have recently experimented with it. Then, Part III explores an 
alternative, nonsequential proportionality test. After describing the 
test’s contours, this Part applies it first to Kenya—retheorizing the 
Kenyan High Court’s recent decision to uphold the country’s sodomy 
law to comport with the nonsequential test—and second, briefly, to 
India, recognizing its transnational prominence in the Commonwealth.  
Finally, Part IV discusses potential obstacles to this Note’s 
proposals for doctrinal reform. First, it examines how politics can affect 
the nature of judicial review by making courts overly deferential to the 
political branches of government, as happened following a 
constitutional crisis in Malaysia. Second, it explores how courts should 
react when colonial-era laws appear to be in line with contemporary 
majoritarian traditions and values. Ultimately, this Part shows that 
neither obstacle provides a valid reason to avoid the doctrinal 
modifications proposed in this Note. 
I.  OSSIFIED REMNANTS OF EMPIRE: COLONIAL LAWS, CONTINUING 
CONTROL 
Great Britain’s colonial influence is obvious in Commonwealth 
penal codes—many still contain colonial-era laws identical or nearly 
 
 18. Whereas some Commonwealth nations, like Canada, use a sequential test, first 
determining whether the government has identified a “sufficiently important” interest (an “end”) 
before using a three-prong second step to determine whether the law is a means proportionate to 
that end, see infra Part II.A, other Commonwealth nations, like South Africa, favor a 
nonsequential balancing test, where courts considering limitations on constitutional freedoms 
tailor the test and the factors considered to the nature of the right and the particular facts of the 
case, see infra Part III.A. 
KANNA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020  12:52 PM 
416  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:411 
identical to the British laws on which they were based.19 As a result, 
institutionalized repression, drawn directly from laws created during 
the colonial era, is a feature of many postcolonial legal systems.20 
Accordingly, the purpose of this Part is twofold. First, it describes how 
colonial control is systemically entrenched in international law. This 
history presents the origins of the colonial legacy this Note calls upon 
courts to consider. Then, this Part introduces the chief criticisms of 
particular laws that are the focus of this Note—sodomy and sedition 
laws. Though focusing primarily on human rights critiques, this Part 
also highlights that these laws have persisted or been explicitly upheld 
in several Commonwealth contexts. 
A. Subjugation and Control: The Underpinnings of the Colonial 
System and Legacy 
Colonial powers transplanted their own laws into their colonial 
possessions21 in an effort to control the native population and maximize 
the colonial power’s ability to exploit and profit from native 
resources.22 Colonial laws were designed to subordinate local practices 
“[t]o overcome resistance to colonial conquest.”23 That these laws 
remained in place after formerly colonized nations achieved 
 
 19. See generally Douglas E. Sanders, 377 and the Unnatural Afterlife of British Colonialism 
in Asia, 4 ASIAN J. COMPAR. L. 1 (2009) (detailing the origins and current ubiquity of Section 377, 
the British colonial antisodomy law, in the Commonwealth). 
 20. See Lea Ypi, What’s Wrong with Colonialism, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 158, 162 (2013) 
(describing colonialism as “a practice that involves both the subjugation of one people to another 
and the political and economic control of a dependent territory (or parts of it)”). But see generally 
Ronald J. Daniels, Michael J. Trebilcock & Lindsey D. Carson, The Legacy of Empire: The 
Common Law Inheritance and Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. 
COMPAR. L. 111 (2011) (using case studies to argue that British colonial arrangements have been 
conducive to the development of the rule of law in former British colonies).  
 21. See John R. Schmidhauser, Legal Imperialism: Its Enduring Impact on Colonial and Post-
Colonial Systems, 13 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 321, 322 (1992) (charting the colonial influence on 
colonized legal systems and organizing them into legal “families” based on the origins of the 
colonial power). 
 22. Colonialism is commonly defined as “the policy or practice of acquiring full or partial 
political control over another country, occupying it with settlers, and exploiting it economically.” 
NEW OXFORD AM. DICTIONARY 338 (3d ed. 2010); see also Colonialism, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/colonialism 
[https://perma.cc/3DB3-UGLH] (describing colonialism as “a practice of domination” and 
providing rich detail as to the relationship between colonialism and Western political theory). 
 23. See Dullah Omar, Constitutional Development: The African Experience, in DEFINING 
THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175–76 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet 
eds., 2002) (explaining that colonial powers overcame resistance by being “increasingly 
authoritarian and suppressive,” especially after World War II). 
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independence reflects a form of historical inertia: “[T]he postcolonial 
state emerged largely constrained and . . . determined by the structural 
values of its predecessor.”24 Today, native governments routinely 
employ fundamentally foreign,25 colonial-era laws to try to control 
citizens’ behavior and stifle dissent. These laws infringe significantly on 
human rights,26 which is precisely why such laws and structures should 
be scrutinized by the courts responsible for their interpretation. 
Justifications for the colonial system of control are reflected in 
international law, which historically defended the colonial enterprise 
by conceiving of colonized peoples as lacking in sovereignty.27 
Professor Antony Anghie traces the development of international law 
from the Renaissance to the modern era, and he argues that early 
conceptions of international law created and reinforced this hierarchy 
between colonizing sovereigns and colonized peoples.28 For example, 
the positivist29 interpretation of international law, which began in the 
nineteenth century and continues to predominate today, espoused a 
hierarchical conception of colonial relationships, taking the view that 
non-European states are “lacking in sovereignty.”30 This notion 
rendered the colonizing state supreme: it was the sole “sovereign state” 
in the colonial relationship and “[could] do as it wishe[d] with regard 
to the non-sovereign entity,” the colonized state, “which lack[ed] the 
legal personality to assert any legal opposition.”31 This conception of 
international law thus served colonizing powers well. Specifically, it 
allowed them to pursue their colonial endeavors by giving them wide 
 
 24. Id. at 177. 
 25. See HAN & O’MAHONEY, supra note 8, at 10 (noting that, while modern governments 
have played a role in the persistence of colonial laws criminalizing homosexuality, “the exact 
wording of the law, the type of offence, and the extent of the penalty, all plausibly might have 
been different had the British not enacted the law in the first place”). 
 26. See Omar, supra note 23, at 177 (arguing that “the colonial state” was often “the 
antithesis of human rights and democracy”). 
 27. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004) (examining interactions between Western and non-Western 
polities throughout history to demonstrate how international law embeds the subordination of 
colonized peoples). 
 28. See generally id. (beginning with Francisco de Vitoria and the inception of international 
law in the colonial era and tracing it through nineteenth-century positivism, the League of 
Nations, postcolonialism, globalization, and the War on Terror). 
 29. Positivism is a central theory of international law that views sovereign states as the chief 
legal actors on the international stage, bound only by compacts to which they have consented. Id. 
at 33. 
 30. Id. at 34. 
 31. Id. 
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latitude to impose their own laws on their colonial possessions without 
violating international law. Accordingly, at their height in the 
nineteenth century, European powers leveraged international law to 
“secur[e] the colonial advantage: the economic and political dominance 
of colonial powers at the expense of colonies during that period.”32 
Twentieth-century developments in international law further 
protected the interests of colonizing powers, creating a system of 
control that withstood the process of formal decolonization. The 
devastation of World War II spurred the development of the 
international human rights legal regime33 and also sparked the wave of 
formal decolonization, the process by which formerly colonial states 
declared and secured independence from the European powers that 
had colonized them.34 Although many colonizing powers voiced 
support for colonized states exercising the right of “self-
determination,”35 achieving formal independence did not end the 
persistence of colonial control.36 In fact, some scholars argue that 
formal decolonization merely replaced the colonial system with a 
neocolonial alternative.37 As evidence, these scholars point to 
 
 32. E. Tendayi Achiume, Reimagining International Law for Global Migration: Migration as 
Decolonization?, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 142, 144 (2017); see also The New Imperialism (c. 1875-
1914), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-
colonialism/The-new-imperialism-c-1875-1914 [https://perma.cc/43PJ-HFCX] (describing the 
“notable speedup in colonial acquisitions” and “increase in the number of colonial powers” that 
took place in the latter half of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries).  
 33. See Johannes Morsink, World War Two and the Universal Declaration, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 
357, 357 (1993) (explaining that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came out of the 
experience of World War II). 
 34. See generally Michael Collins, Decolonization, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EMPIRE (John M. 
MacKenzie ed., 2016) (describing formal decolonization as “flag independence” but noting that 
the decolonization process did not end there due to neocolonialism, postcolonialism, and the 
intersection of decolonization and globalization). 
 35. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/4684, at 67 (1960) (“All peoples have the right to self-
determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”). 
 36. See Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, supra note 14, at 1518 (“Although 
international law facilitated formal independence for many political communities, for former 
colonies nation-statehood hardly did enough to disrupt relations of colonial exploitation.”). 
 37. See generally, e.g., SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY (2011) (analyzing 
contemporary institutions of international law through the examples of decolonization, 
sovereignty over natural resources, and the end of the Cold War to argue that international law 
has continued to subordinate Third World, postcolonial states even in the modern era); Achiume, 
Migration as Decolonization, supra note 14, at 1539–41 (surveying interdisciplinary literature 
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multilateral institutions and bilateral relationships that favor the 
political and economic interests of formerly colonizing states while 
simultaneously rendering formerly colonized states politically and 
economically inferior.38 For instance, some scholars criticize the 
international human rights system for centering on Western 
conceptions of rights, creating a “false universalism” of human rights 
that does not account for global South cultures.39 This undermines the 
political and economic power of formerly colonized states because 
global North countries use the system “to intervene in the affairs of 
other less powerful and wealthy countries that do not meet their 
civilizational standards.”40 
Beyond this systemic critique of how the international legal system 
perpetuates colonial control, other scholars criticize the colonial 
entrenchment in postcolonial legal documents, like constitutions and 
codes.41 Ultimately, colonial powers imposed on colonized states the 
criminal laws at issue in this Note, and the systemic persistence of 
 
showing “that the present era is defined by neocolonial imperialism, even if formal colonial 
imperialism has been outlawed”). 
 38. See Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Realities, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 739, 748–49 (2006) (following formal decolonization, “colonialism 
was replaced by neo-colonialism; Third world states continued to play a subordinate role in the 
international system because they were economically dependent on the West, and the rules of 
international economic law continued to ensure that this would be the case”). Achiume provides 
a framework for this critique:  
First, within and through international institutions and bilateral arrangements, Third 
World nation-states are politically subordinate. The decisionmaking power they have—
via the rules governing these international and bilateral fora—is unquestionably less 
than that of First World nation-states, which maintain superordinate positions. Second, 
Third World nation-states are economically subordinate, which not only is a harm in 
and of itself, but also further reinforces their political subordination. 
Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, supra note 14, at 1544–45 (footnote omitted).  
 39. César Rodríguez-Garavito & Sean Luna McAdams, A Human Rights Crisis? Unpacking 
the Debate on the Future of the Human Rights Field 8 (Mar. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2919703 [https://perma.cc/STR8-8J5X]. According to 
Professor César Rodríguez-Garavito and political scientist Sean Luna McAdams, many scholars 
claim that “the human rights project is another form of imperialism or civilizing mission pursued 
by Western states trying to veil their power schemes in the global South.” Id. While this Note 
urges courts to consider the validity of laws from the colonial era using an international human 
rights lens, it is also important to highlight critiques of how the international human rights 
system’s own development has been influenced by Western colonial powers.  
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Sandipto Dasgupta, “A Language Which is Foreign to Us”: Continuities and 
Anxieties in the Making of the Indian Constitution, 34 COMPAR. STUD. S. ASIA, AFR. & MIDDLE 
E. 228, 228 (2014) (arguing that “[t]he explicit persistence of the colonial constitutional 
structure . . . is a central current in the life of postcolonial constitutionalism”). 
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neocolonial influences can help explain the continuity of these laws 
into the modern era.42 
B. Colonial Criminal Laws: Pervasive, Antiquated, and Problematic 
Sodomy laws and sedition laws, where they remain in force, are 
vestiges of British colonialism in Commonwealth nations.43 Sodomy 
laws “criminalize consensual homosexual conduct between adult 
men,” and sometimes between women as well.44 Sedition laws are 
crimes against the state that generally prohibit written or spoken 
opposition to the regime in power.45 These laws, taken together, 
implicate and may infringe long-recognized international human 
rights, such as the freedoms of association and of expression,46 as well 
as the rights to privacy and equal treatment.47 Moreover, these laws in 
form and in substance are remarkably similar throughout the 
Commonwealth.48 The Indian Penal Code in particular, drafted by a 
 
 42. For instance, Britain lost much of its formal power during the midcentury wave of 
decolonization. In this new and uncertain world, it sought to maintain its influence indirectly, 
maintaining close economic and strategic ties with elites in former colonies like Kenya, which is 
one of this Note’s focus countries. POPPY CULLEN, KENYA AND BRITAIN AFTER 
INDEPENDENCE: BEYOND NEO-COLONIALISM 145–80 (2017).  
 43. See, e.g., Rhoda E. Howard, Legitimacy and Class Rule in Commonwealth Africa: 
Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law, 7 THIRD WORLD Q. 323, 325 (1985) (“Sedition laws were 
routinely used in order to control political protest, especially in the press, and were much more 
restrictive in Africa than in Britain itself.”). See generally Sanders, supra note 19 (discussing the 
undeniable colonial origin of Section 377, the sodomy law that exists throughout the 
Commonwealth). 
 44. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, THIS ALIEN LEGACY, supra note 6, at 4 (explaining that more 
than eighty countries currently have such laws). 
 45. Sedition, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2018), https://www.britannica.com/topic/sedition  
[https://perma.cc/8SAS-8MTS]. 
 46. See generally Chapter Four: Freedom of Assembly, Association and Expression, in INT’L 
COMM. OF JURISTS, SOGI CASEBOOK (Sept. 6, 2011), https://www.icj.org/sogi-casebook-
introduction/chapter-four-freedom-of-assembly-association-and-expression [https://perma.cc/ 
7T3T-4BUP] (noting that laws prohibiting the LGBTQ community from organizing and speaking 
out about sexuality “must not violate the guarantees of equality and non-discrimination found in 
both international and domestic constitutional law”—that is, “public morality” cannot be used to 
“mask prejudice”).  
 47. See, e.g., Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 
(1994), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/html/vws488.htm [https://perma.cc/K2LT-88CU] (holding  
that Tasmania’s law criminalizing sodomy was a violation of complainant’s human rights under 
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which recognizes a right to 
privacy).  
 48. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 19, at 8 (describing the global spread of Section 377, the 
British colonial sodomy law). Sanders describes Section 377 as one part of “a comprehensive code 
designed to state in an orderly and rational way the complete body of British criminal law.” Id. 
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British parliamentary commission,49 was widely adopted elsewhere in 
Asia and in Africa as a “a one-size-fits-all model code.”50 
While this Note focuses particularly on sodomy and sedition laws 
in the Commonwealth, these are not the only human-rights-implicating 
laws implemented during the colonial era.51 Despite the problematic 
nature of these archaic laws, they persist in many Commonwealth 
nations, where some courts routinely uphold them when explicitly 
challenged.52 While national legislatures can repeal them, these laws 
often target groups without adequate representation in the political 
 
 49. Id. at 10–11. According to Sanders, the Indian Penal Code “was not a document that 
reflected existing Indian laws or customs. It was largely a rewrite of the British Royal 
Commission’s 1843 draft [Indian Penal Code].” Id. at 11.  
 50. Id. at 12–14. But see ANDERSON & KILLINGRAY, supra note 7, at 5 (“English law was 
transplanted in the colonies, but that transplantation bred several mutant strains.”). This Note 
does not imply that the colonial experience was identical across the British Empire, but rather it 
focuses on cases where the British influence was particularly pervasive. 
 51. See, e.g., HAKEEM O. YUSUF, COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH 6 (2014) (identifying “peace, order, and good government” clauses in 
Commonwealth constitutions as “a creation of British imperialism to facilitate direct or indirect 
control and governance of its overseas possessions”); Chitnis & Wright, supra note 14, at 1326–
38 (highlighting the British colonial origins of Indian inheritance laws, consent laws, and abortion 
laws); George Baylon Radics, Singapore: A ‘Fine’ City: British Colonial Sentencing Policies and 
Its Lasting Effects on the Singaporean Corporal State, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 57, 61 (2014) 
(examining Singapore’s corporal punishment laws, which originated during the British colonial 
era, “to demonstrate that many of the laws that Singapore is criticized for today can be traced 
back to the laws handed down by its former colonial rulers”); Atlaf Khan, Backed by Colonial-
Era Laws, Pakistan Has Declared War on Free Speech, QUARTZ INDIA (Apr. 17, 2017), 
https://qz.com/india/960754/backed-by-colonial-era-blasphemy-laws-pakistan-has-declared-war-
on-free-speech [https://perma.cc/7WVS-BFPV] (emphasizing that Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, 
transplanted during the British colonial era, penalize “‘disrespectful’ behaviour or words against 
religion” with death); Eli Meixler, Hong Kong’s Use of Emergency Powers Explained, FIN. TIMES 
(Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/16f704c6-e68c-11e9-b112-9624ec9edc59 [https://
perma.cc/7Y2J-KFE5] (noting that emergency powers recently invoked by the Hong Kong 
government in response to widescale protests originated during the British colonial era).  
 52. See, e.g., Ong v. Att’y Gen., [2020] SGHC 63, ¶ 315 (High Ct. 2020) (Sing.), 
https://www.humandignitytrust.org/wp-content/uploads/resources/OMJ-v-A-G-and-other-matters- 
2020-SGHC-63-Judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DHW-AHG8] (upholding Section 377A of the 
criminal code, the sodomy law from the British colonial era); EG v. Att’y Gen. (2019) K.L.R. 1, 
33–56 (H.C.K.) (Kenya), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/173946 [https://perma.cc/
6VRQ-DGAL] (upholding Kenya’s sodomy law); see also Jacob Kushner, The British Empire’s 
Homophobia Lives on in Former Colonies, ATLANTIC (May 24, 2019), theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2019/05/kenya-supreme-court-lgbtq/590014 [https://perma.cc/576L-8NZQ] 
(highlighting the Kenya High Court’s 2019 decision to uphold the sodomy law, despite the fact 
that the 2010 constitution “explicitly guarantees equal protection to all people, freedom of 
expression, and freedom from discrimination, as well as requires affirmative-action programs for 
minorities and marginalized groups”).  
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process.53 As a result, it may fall to courts to address these laws.54 To 
best do that, this Note argues that courts must supplement their current 
legal analysis with an understanding of the colonial roots of sodomy 
and sedition laws when considering constitutional challenges to them.  
1. Sodomy Laws.  Sodomy laws were long ago outlawed in Britain, 
where the original sixteenth-century laws were repealed in the Sexual 
Offences Act of 1967.55 While several Commonwealth nations, like 
India, have addressed their sodomy laws through legislative repeal or 
judicial action,56 these laws remain in place in many other 
Commonwealth nations,57 including Malaysia58 and Kenya.59 While 
those sodomy laws still in force criminalize specific conduct, they 
function to penalize gay individuals in particular, thus rendering these 
laws discriminatory.60 In addition, these laws often carry excessive 
punishments, including imprisonment for periods of more than ten 
years.61 Nations generally wield sodomy laws as “broad instruments of 
social control,”62 and where they have been struck down or repealed, 
 
 53. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, STIFLING DISSENT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PEACEFUL 
EXPRESSION IN INDIA 2 (2016) [hereinafter HUM. RTS. WATCH, STIFLING DISSENT], 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/india0516.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H6G-3EHS] 
(describing the marginalized nature of groups targeted by sedition laws).  
 54. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (recognizing 
that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”). 
 55. Sexual Offences Act 1967, c. 60, §§ 1–11 (Eng.). 
 56. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 112 (India), https://indiankanoon
.org/doc/119980704 [https://perma.cc/4U6W-V39P]. 
 57. Nico Lang, Theresa May Urges 37 Countries To Repeal Sodomy Laws Amid Pressure 
from LGBTQ Advocates, INTO (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.intomore.com/culture/theresa-may-
urges-37-countries-to-repeal-sodomy-laws-amid-pressure-from-lgbtq-advocates [https://perma.cc/ 
76T7-HC37]. Since May’s comments, the High Court of Botswana, another former British colony, 
has overruled the nation’s sodomy law. Arthur S. Leonard, Botswana Sodomy Law Struck Down, 
GAY CITY NEWS (June 15, 2019), https://www.gaycitynews.nyc/stories/2019/13/botswana-
sodomy-ban-mokgweetsi-masisi-2019-06-15-gcn.html [https://perma.cc/EU5W-2QH2].  
 58. PENAL CODE, § 377A, Act No. 574 (Malay.).  
 59. PENAL CODE, ch. 63, § 162, as amended (Kenya). 
 60. See, e.g., Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Just. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 
108 (S. Afr.), http://saflii.mobi/za/cases/ZACC/1998/15.html [https://perma.cc/7STA-53PP] 
(“Thus, it is not the act of sodomy that is denounced . . . but the so-called sodomite who performs 
it; not any proven social damage, but the threat that same-sex passion in itself is seen as 
representing to heterosexual hegemony.”).  
 61. See, e.g., PENAL CODE, ch. 63, § 162, as amended (Kenya) (providing that conviction may 
result in a prison term of up to fourteen years). 
 62. HUM. RTS. WATCH, THIS ALIEN LEGACY, supra note 6, at 53. 
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many courts and legislators have recognized that these laws are 
“violative of the [constitutional] right to dignity and the right to 
privacy.”63 In addition, sodomy laws arguably conflict with the 
constitutional right to equal treatment.64 
Calls for decriminalizing sodomy are often based on the right to 
privacy. Professor Douglas Sanders’s influential paper on Section 377, 
the current or former criminal code section number for sodomy laws 
throughout the Commonwealth, describes several different bases for 
decriminalization grounded in international human rights law.65 As 
related to privacy, Sanders describes how Jeremy Bentham, famous for 
his theory of utilitarianism, was one of the earliest advocates for the 
decriminalization of sodomy.66 According to Bentham, only laws that 
caused harm to others should be criminalized; sodomy laws, which 
prohibited private and consensual acts, were thus inappropriate 
exercises of criminal law.67 The American Law Institute adopted this 
conception of homosexual acts as within the realm of “private 
morality,”68 and ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated 
sodomy laws throughout the United States based on the right to 
privacy encapsulated in constitutional substantive due process rights.69 
Furthermore, in considering a sodomy law in the Australian state of 
Tasmania, the U.N. Human Rights Committee found a violation of the 
 
 63. E.g., Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 67 (India), https://indian
kanoon.org/doc/119980704 [https://perma.cc/4U6W-V39P]. 
 64. Sodomy laws arguably abridge equal protection principles generally present in 
Commonwealth constitutions. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION, art. 27(1) (2010) (Kenya) (“Every person 
is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.”); 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, art. 8(1) (2010) (Malay.) (“All persons are equal before the law and 
entitled to the equal protection of the law.”). But see FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, art. 149(1)(f) 
(2007) (Malay.) (limiting protections for personal liberty and freedoms of speech and association, 
among others, if they are inconsistent with acts of Parliament taken to prevent threats to the 
“public order”). This Note later considers the impact of limitations clauses on fundamental rights. 
See infra Parts II & III.  
 65. See Sanders, supra note 19, at 22–38 (summarizing the history of, and justifications for, 
decriminalizing sodomy, including those based on the right to privacy and equality rights).  
 66. Id. at 24.  
 67. Id.; see also Faramerz Dabhiowala, Of Sexual Irregularities by Jeremy Bentham – Review, 
GUARDIAN (June 26, 2014, 9:35 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/jun/26/sexual-
irregularities-morality-jeremy-bentham-review [https://perma.cc/Q5TT-QNSE] (“The main 
impetus for Bentham’s [defense of] sexual freedom was [British] society’s harsh persecution of 
homosexual men.”). 
 68. Sanders, supra note 19, at 24. 
 69. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for 
their private lives.”). 
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complainant’s right to privacy per Article 17 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).70 
2. Sedition Laws.  Like sodomy laws, sedition laws are noteworthy 
for their oppressive application. Whereas England abolished the 
common law offenses of sedition and seditious libel with the passage of 
the Coroners and Justice Act of 2009,71 many colonial-era sedition laws 
based on the offenses remain in place.72 Moreover, “it was in the 
colonies that [sedition laws] assumed their most draconian form, 
helping to sustain imperial power in the face of rising nationalism in 
the colonies.”73 These laws’ oppressive nature has persisted in the 
postcolonial state. For example, in the last few years, the Malaysian 
government has forcefully wielded the country’s colonial-era sedition 
law to suppress antigovernment voices.74 Despite a 2013 campaign 
promise to repeal the Sedition Act, Malaysia’s government invoked it 
in several recent high-profile prosecutions against human rights and 
anticorruption activists.75 Moreover, sedition laws often carry serious 
penalties. In India, for example, a conviction under the country’s 
 
 70. See Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/html/vws488.htm [https://perma.cc/K2LT-88CU] (“Inasmuch as 
article 17 is concerned, it is undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity in private is covered 
by the concept of ‘privacy,’ and that Mr. Toonen is actually and currently affected by the 
continued existence of the Tasmanian laws.”).  
 71. Clare Feikert-Ahalt, Sedition in England: The Abolition of a Law from a Bygone Era, IN 
CUSTODIA LEGIS (Oct. 2, 2012), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2012/10/sedition-in-england-the-abo
lition-of-a-law-from-a-bygone-era [https://perma.cc/F8XR-RNFU].  
 72. See, e.g., Sedition Act 1948, § 4 (Malay.) (criminalizing “seditious tendenc[ies]” against 
the Ruler and Government). The Malaysian government has promised to repeal the Sedition Act 
but has yet to do so and is still charging individuals under the Act. See Malaysia: End Use of 
Sedition Act, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 17, 2019, 8:55 PM), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2019/07/17/malaysia-end-use-sedition-act [https://perma.cc/9CTM-GEZ8] (urging Malaysia 
to reinstate its moratorium on the Sedition Act). 
 73. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. EXCLUSION & INCLUSIVE POL’Y, NAT’L L. SCH. OF INDIA 
UNIV. & ALT. L. F., SEDITION LAWS & THE DEATH OF FREE SPEECH IN INDIA 7 (2011), 
http://altlawforum.org/publications/sedition-laws-the-death-of-free-speech-in-india [https://
perma.cc/685N-2DMY]; see also Press Release, Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., U.N., 
Malaysia Sedition Act Threatens Freedom of Expression by Criminalising Dissent (Oct. 8, 2014), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15144& [https://per
ma.cc/2KDM-3Y8T] (calling on Malaysia to repeal the Sedition Act of 1948). 
 74. LINDA LAKHDHIR, HUM. RTS. WATCH, CREATING A CULTURE OF FEAR: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF PEACEFUL EXPRESSION IN MALAYSIA 24–27 (2015), https://www.
hrw.org/report/2015/10/26/creating-culture-fear/criminalization-peaceful-expression-malaysia [https:// 
perma.cc/9UTG-M5F9]. 
 75. Id. 
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sedition law may result in life imprisonment.76 Even where penalties 
are less severe, the scope of criminal acts under Commonwealth 
sedition laws can be very broad.77 Finally, governments often 
weaponize sedition laws to target marginalized communities—political 
dissidents, ethnic or religious minorities, and other groups—
highlighting their often discriminatory application.78 Crystallizing these 
points, Mahatma Gandhi famously stated during his sedition trial, 
“Section 124A under which I am happily charged is perhaps the prince 
among the political sections of the Indian Penal Code designed to 
suppress the liberty of the citizen.”79 
Human rights critiques of sedition laws have generally focused on 
the laws’ potential to violate freedoms of expression, assembly, and 
association.80 Ahead of a recent meeting of the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee to review mandatory reports submitted by ICCPR member 
states,81 the NGO Human Rights Watch82 called on the Committee to 
consider India’s Sedition Act in light of Articles 19, 21, and 22 of the 
Covenant, which protect the freedoms of expression, assembly, and 
association, respectively.83 Commonwealth governments sometimes 
justify still-existing sedition laws as restrictions of free speech necessary 
 
 76. Sedition, PEN. CODE § 124A (1860) (India). 
 77. First-time offenders under the Malaysia’s Sedition Act may be sentenced to a maximum 
prison sentence of three years and forced to pay a fine. Sedition Act 1948, § 4(1). Nevertheless, 
one may be sentenced for doing or attempting “any act” with a “seditious tendency”; “utter[ing] 
any seditious words”; or printing, publishing, or importing “seditious publication[s].” These 
provisions demonstrate the broad application of the sedition offense. Id. § 4(1)(a)–(d). 
 78. HUM. RTS. WATCH, STIFLING DISSENT, supra note 53, at 2 (“[Sedition] laws are used to 
stifle political dissent, harass journalists, restrict activities by nongovernmental organizations, 
arbitrarily block Internet sites or take down content, and target religious minorities and 
marginalized communities . . . .”). 
 79. 2 SOURCES OF INDIAN TRADITIONS 357–59 (Rachel Fell McDermott, Leonard A. 
Gordon, Ainslie T. Embree, Frances W. Pritchett & Dennis Dalton eds., 3d ed. 2014) (describing 
Gandhi’s 1922 trial for “attempting to excite disaffection towards His Majesty’s Government”). 
 80. Submission to the UN Human Rights Committee Review of India, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(May 15, 2019, 9:35 AM) [hereinafter Submission to UN Human Rights Committee], 
hrw.org/news/2019/05/15/submission-un-human-rights-committee-review-india [https://perma.cc/ 
38MW-ZKGF].  
 81. India ratified the ICCPR in 1979. See Status of Ratifications – India, OFF. HIGH COMM’R 
HUM. RTS. (2019), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/INIndex.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/GY9A-6ZGJ] (providing an overview of India’s human rights treaty ratifications). 
 82. Submission to UN Human Rights Committee, supra note 80.  
 83. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 19, 21, 22, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171.  
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to preserve public order and communitarian values.84 Unlike sodomy 
laws, whose detractors can rely on privacy rights to challenge them, 
sedition laws cover behavior that by definition takes place in the public 
sphere. As a result, governments often counter human rights critiques 
with justifications based on unique cultural norms and the need to 
maintain public order and unity.85 Nevertheless, these justifications are 
hypocritical:  
For people to enjoy . . . values as a community, they must be allowed 
to exercise their individual right to come together as a collective and 
determine their community rights and values. Fleeting governments 
are not the sole legitimators of rights, but rather it is the underlying 
collection of the people’s legitimacy that determines rights.86  
This right is furnished through the freedom of expression, which would 
be served by narrowing the scope of sedition laws.  
Encouragingly, Commonwealth courts seem to be developing a 
consciousness of these laws’ colonial legacies when considering 
challenges to their validity.87 Nevertheless, these acknowledgements 
generally appear in dicta. This Note contends that such considerations 
should move from the background into the foreground of judicial 
review. The next two Parts delve deeper into how this doctrinal change 
should look.  
 
 84. See, e.g., Scott L. Goodroad, Comment, The Challenge of Free Speech: Asian Values v. 
Unfettered Free Speech, An Analysis of Singapore and Malaysia in the New Global Order, 9 IND. 
INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 259, 261 (1998) (undergirding the continued use of sedition laws “are 
several unique Asian values which are purported to ensure the prosperity and vitality of 
Malaysia . . . and many other countries of East and South East Asia, which include[:] . . . strong 
familial connections, sacrificing individual rights for that of the community, and maintaining a 
well-ordered society”). 
 85. See id. at 295 (arguing that, while “limitations on free speech seem self-serving for the 
leadership, ethnic conflicts and social disruptions cannot be denied”). 
 86. Id. at 301–02.  
 87. See, e.g., Nervais v. The Queen, [2018] CCJ 19 (AJ) at 29 (Barb.), https://ccj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/2018-CCJ-19-AJ-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7BK-HEA7] (“[T]he laws 
conform to the supreme law of the Constitution and are not calcified to reflect the colonial times.”); 
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 119 (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/ 
119980704 [https://perma.cc/4U6W-V39P] (“[Section 377], understood as prohibiting non-peno 
vaginal intercourse, reflects the imposition of a particular set of morals by a colonial power at a 
particular point in history.”); Motshidiemang v. Att’y Gen., [2019] MAHGB-000591-16 at 29 
(Bots.), https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/legabibo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/REF9-KADY] (“In the incorporation of the offence of sodomy in the colonies, 
such was not preceded by any consultation with the local populace.”).  
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II.  THE ROLE OF COURTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SEQUENTIAL 
PROPORTIONALITY 
Many Commonwealth courts considering constitutional 
challenges employ proportionality principles to decide laws’ validity.88 
Proportionality review involves, in its most basic form, a means-end 
test. To justify the law, the government must specify its goal and prove 
the law is an appropriate means to achieve it.89 Among Commonwealth 
nations, Canada has long used a sequential proportionality test to 
determine the validity of laws challenged under its Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.90 This Part uses Canada’s test to illustrate the 
mechanics of sequential proportionality. Then, it illustrates the 
usefulness of modifying sequential proportionality to take account of a 
criminal law’s colonial roots by considering an example from Malaysia. 
There, courts have been inspired to adopt a sequential proportionality 
test and should continue to develop it to account for postcolonial 
dynamics. 
A. Sequential Proportionality: The Canadian Example 
Canada is generally regarded as having popularized the notion of 
sequential proportionality analysis as a tool of judicial review in the 
Commonwealth,91 particularly through the case R v. Oakes.92 When 
considering the constitutionality of a rights-limiting law, the court first 
examines the threshold question of whether the government’s 
limitation on a constitutional right serves a “sufficiently important” 
 
 88. See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 68, 74 (2008) [hereinafter Sweet & Mathews, 
Proportionality Balancing] (highlighting the spread of proportionality tests to Commonwealth 
jurisdictions like Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa). But see, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 984 (1987) (“A common objection 
to balancing as a method of constitutional adjudication is that it appears to replicate the job that 
a democratic society demands of its legislature.”). 
 89. Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality (1), in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 719 (Michael Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).  
 90. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 105–06 (Can.) (articulating Canada’s three-part 
proportionality test for the first time). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an 
Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094 (2015) (referencing Canada repeatedly for its use of 
a sequenced proportionality test). 
 91. See Jackson, supra note 90, at 3096 n.2 (“The German Constitutional Court has been 
particularly influential, as has the Canadian Supreme Court, in developing ‘proportionality 
review’ in ways that influence other countries.”). 
 92. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). 
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purpose, or end.93 If the government fails to articulate a sufficiently 
important purpose, the inquiry ends but, importantly, “almost no 
Canadian law fails because of an insufficient purpose.”94 Once this 
purpose is determined, the court moves onto the second step of the 
inquiry, evaluating the means used to achieve it—that is, the law 
itself—via a three-part proportionality test that asks: (1) whether the 
law is “rationally connected” to the stated purpose; (2) whether the law 
“impair[s] the right in question as little as possible”; and (3) whether 
the limitations are proportional to the objective—“the more severe the 
deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must 
be.”95 In effect, this test “prioritizes the right, putting the burden of 
justification on the government.”96 
The Canadian sequential proportionality test is relatively flexible. 
Once the court determines the government has articulated a 
sufficiently important purpose, the proportionality test’s first step 
requires the government to show a “rational[] connect[ion]” between 
the law and the government’s stated objective.97 Professors Jud 
Mathews and Alec Stone Sweet note that “[t]his mode of scrutiny is 
broadly akin to what Americans call ‘rational basis’ review, although 
under [proportionality analysis], the appraisal of government motives 
and choice of means is more searching.”98 The second step of the 
proportionality test is similar to a “least-restrictive-means”99 or 
“minimal impairment”100 test. As Professor Vicki Jackson argues, 
however, “the minimal impairment test does not necessarily imply that 
if any less restrictive approach can be imagined, the law is invalid.”101 
In the Canadian Supreme Court’s terms, “[t]he government is not 
required to pursue the least drastic means of achieving its objective, 
 
 93. Id. at 105; see also Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 1, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.) (the rights 
limitation must be “prescribed by law”—that is, an obligation imposed by law). 
 94. Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
57 U. TORONTO L.J. 383, 388 (2007). 
 95. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R at 106. 
 96. Jackson, supra note 90, at 3100. 
 97. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 103. 
 98. Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review 
and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 802 (2011).  
 99. See id. at 803 (describing the second step as ensuring that the judge limits rights only to 
the extent necessary). 
 100. See Jackson, supra note 90, at 3114 (explaining the minimal impairment aspect of the 
second step and its requirements). 
 101. Id.  
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but it must adopt a measure that falls within a range of reasonable 
alternatives.”102 The third and final step embodies the principle of 
proportionality most closely, “call[ing] for an independent judicial 
evaluation of whether the reasons offered by the government, relative 
to the limitation on rights, are sufficient to justify the intrusion.”103 This 
step allows judges to fulfill their constitutionally required role of 
“assur[ing] appropriate attention to rights within a framework of 
constitutional justice.”104 Additionally, the court has discretion to 
adjust the level of rigor at each step, as demonstrated in the next 
Section’s treatment of Malaysia’s proportionality test.  
Canada’s proportionality test is best understood in light of Section 
One of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states 
that rights and freedoms protected by the Charter are “subject only to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.”105 Thus, the test is designed 
to determine whether limitations are “reasonable” and therefore 
constitutional.106 The nexus between Canada’s limitations clause and 
its proportionality test may be instructive for Commonwealth nations 
whose constitutions also contain similar provisions furnishing possible 
limitations or restrictions on rights and freedoms.107  
 
 102. Mounted Police Ass’n Ont. v. Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3, 77 (Can.). 
 103. Jackson, supra note 90, at 3099.  
 104. Id. at 3101.  
 105. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (UK). 
 106. See Jackson, supra note 90, at 3111 (“Canadian doctrine has developed a proportionality 
test to determine whether this standard [set forth in Section One] is met.”). 
 107. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION, art. 24 (2010) (Kenya) (“A right or fundamental freedom in the 
Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors . . . .”); FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, Nov. 1, 
2010, art. 10, § 2, cl. a–c (Malay.) (allowing Parliament to impose “such restrictions as it deems 
necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation” on the freedoms of speech 
and expression; assembly; and association, respectively); S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 36(1) (“The 
rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors . . . .”). 
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B. Sequential Proportionality and Sedition: A Case Study of Malaysia 
Malaysian civil courts108 have favorably referenced proportionality 
principles109 when considering constitutional challenges to the validity 
of statutes. Two recent cases are of particular note for how a 
proportionality test could address the country’s sedition law, which was 
enacted in 1948 by British administrators110 and is paradigmatic of 
colonial holdovers wielded as instruments of social control. In Public 
Prosecutor v. Azmi bin Sharom,111 decided in 2015, the Federal Court, 
Malaysia’s highest court, purported to apply a proportionality test 
while considering the Sedition Act’s constitutionality; in reality, the 
Federal Court upheld the law without fully applying the test.112 Despite 
this, a more recent decision has positioned the Federal Court to apply 
proportionality more robustly. In Alma Nudo Atenza v. Public 
Prosecutor, 113 a 2019 challenge to a different act, the Federal Court 
 
 108. Malaysia’s court system is bifurcated into civil courts and Islamic courts, the latter of 
which have jurisdiction over claims by Muslim citizens falling within certain areas of subject 
matter jurisdiction. See generally Farid S. Shuaib, The Islamic Legal System in Malaysia, 21 PAC. 
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 85 (2012) (describing Malaysia’s separation of civil, secular courts from Islamic 
courts, which are given special jurisdiction over constitutionally enumerated areas). The 
arguments here are not directed toward such Islamic courts, which deal with jurisdictional 
questions based on religious doctrine beyond the scope of this Note. 
 109. See, e.g., Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malay., [2010] 2 MLJ 333, 339, 350 (Malay.), 
https://www.slideshare.net/surrenderyourthrone/sivarasa-v-badan-peguam-malaysia?from_action= 
save [https://perma.cc/D5DZ-A2BF] (applying proportionality principles to a challenge under 
Article 10 of the Constitution to the Legal Profession Act of 1976, where petitioner, an attorney 
disqualified for a position on the Malaysian Bar Council because of his status as a member of 
Parliament, argued that the Act violated his freedom of association).  
 110. See ANDREW HARDING, LAW, GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MALAYSIA 
192 (1996) (pointing to English jurist Sir James Stephen as the originator of Malaysia’s definition 
of sedition); Jennifer Pak, What Is Malaysia’s Sedition Law?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29373164 [https://perma.cc/HD8E-WRH8] (reporting that 
the law was enacted “by the British colonial government in 1948 to use against local communist 
insurgents”); see also Malaysia: End Use of Sedition Act, supra note 72 (describing the former 
government’s alleged promises to repeal the Act during the 2018 election campaign but pointing 
out its recent use of the law to target political dissenters). More recently, public pressure to repeal 
the law has continued, but the government has been equivocal about its intentions to do so. See 
Ida Nadirah Ibrahim, Gov’t Mulling New Law To Replace Sedition Act, Says PM, MALAY MAIL 
(July 11, 2019, 1:31 PM), https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/07/11/govt-mulls-new-
law-to-replace-sedition-act-pm-says/1770394 [https://perma.cc/6XJU-3FEG]. 
 111. Pub. Prosecutor v. Azmi Sharom, [2015] 8 CLJ 921 (Malay.), https://www.malikimtiaz. 
com.my/doc/azmi-sharom.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HAL-VQMC]. 
 112. See id. at 942–43 (referencing and providing the proportionality test articulated in 
Sivarasa Rasiah, [2010] 2 MLJ at 350, while only nominally and briefly applying it to the facts of 
the case). 
 113. Alma Nudo Atenza v. Pub. Prosecutor, [2019] 3 MLRA 1, 34–40 (Malay.), 
http://www.elaw.my/JE/01/JE1_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR2M-5YEC].  
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cited to Canada’s test and fully applied a three-step sequential 
proportionality test, ultimately holding a rights restriction 
unconstitutional.114 In a future challenge to the Sedition Act, the 
Federal Court should apply the Alma Nudo proportionality test, 
making sure to consider the law’s colonial origins as reflective of its 
purposes. This Section gives a more detailed explanation of these two 
cases before illustrating how the Alma Nudo test would apply to 
Malaysia’s sedition law. 
In Azmi bin Sharom, the defendant was charged under §§ 4(1)(b) 
and (c) of the Sedition Act, which provide that “[a]ny person 
who . . . utters any seditious words”115 or “prints, publishes, sells, offers 
for sale, distributes or reproduces any seditious publication,”116 
respectively, “shall be guilty of an offence.”117 The defendant 
challenged the constitutionality of the act, arguing that it was 
inconsistent with Article 10 of the Malaysian Constitution, which 
enshrines the freedoms of speech, assembly, and association.118 The 
court analyzed the merits of the defendant’s claim set against Article 
10’s limitations clause, which specifies that the government may 
impose:  
such restrictions [on the freedoms of speech, assembly, and 
association] as it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the 
security of the Federation or . . . designed to protect the privileges of 
Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or to provide against 
contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence.119  
In analyzing whether the challenged sections of the act were 
consistent with Article 10’s limitations clause, the Court ultimately 
purported to apply a proportionality test,120 although its treatment of 
the law under this test was cursory. The Court listed the steps of its own 
proportionality test, established earlier in Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan 
 
 114. Id. (holding that § 37A of the Dangerous Drugs Act violated Articles 5 and 8 of the 
Constitution, which protect rights to personal liberty and equal treatment, respectively).  
 115. Sedition Act 1948 (Act 15 of 1969), § 4(1)(b) (Malay.).  
 116. Id. § 4(1)(c). 
 117. Id. § 4(1). 
 118. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, Nov. 1, 2010, art. 10 (Malay.). 
 119. Id. art. 10(2). 
 120. Pub. Prosecutor v. Azmi Sharom, [2015] 8 CLJ 921, 942–43 (Malay.), https://www.malikimtiaz. 
com.my/doc/azmi-sharom.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HAL-VQMC]. 
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Peguam Malaysia,121 which, similar to Canada’s test, requires the 
government to demonstrate that:  
(a) [it has] an objective that is sufficiently important to justify limiting 
the right in question; (b) the measures designed by the relevant state 
action to meet its objective must have a rational nexus with that 
objective; and (c) the means used by the relevant state action to 
infringe the right asserted must be proportionate to the object it seeks 
to achieve.122 
Despite expressly articulating the test and devoting an entire 
subsection to analyzing the law under it,123 the Federal Court neglected 
to consider each step in turn. Instead, the Federal Court applied a 
“proximate connection” test borrowed from an earlier case.124 There, 
the Court dealt with a challenge under Article 10 of the Constitution 
by dictating that the “connection contemplated” between the law and 
the limitation under Article 10(2) “must be real and proximate, not far-
fetched or problematical.”125 Thus, although the Azmi bin Sharom 
Court claimed to apply a proportionality test, it actually analyzed 
whether the challenged provisions of the act were “too remote or not 
sufficiently connected”126 with the limitations under Article 10(2) of the 
Constitution. This analysis resembled the first prong of Canada’s 
sequential proportionality test,127 but the Federal Court’s curt 
proportionality analysis ended there. The Federal Court concluded 
that the connections between the general prohibitions against 
“seditious tendencies” under the act were not too remote, and thus 
were within the ambit of Article 10(2).128 
Despite Azmi bin Sharom’s trivial application of proportionality 
to the defendant’s challenge to the Sedition Act, Malaysian courts have 
 
 121. Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malay., [2010] 2 MLJ 333, 350 (Malay.), 
https://www.slideshare.net/surrenderyourthrone/sivarasa-v-badan-peguam-malaysia?from_action= 
save [https://perma.cc/D5DZ-A2BF]. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Azmi Sharom, [2015] 8 CLJ at 942–43 (subjecting the law to explicit treatment under 
a proportionality analysis). 
 124. Id. at 937–38, 942–43 (citing Pub. Prosecutor v. Pung Chen Choon, [1994] 1 MLJ 566 
(Malay.), https://www.slideshare.net/surrenderyourthrone/pp-v-pung-chen-choon [https://perma.cc/ 
W88X-Y2SC]).  
 125. Id. at 937. 
 126. Id. at 942. 
 127. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 106 (Can.) (articulating the first step of a three-step 
test asking whether the law is “rationally connected” to the stated purpose). 
 128. Azmi Sharom, [2015] 8 CLJ at 942. 
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recently demonstrated more robust approval of sequential 
proportionality.129 In Alma Nudo, the Federal Court considered a 
challenge to the constitutionality of Malaysia’s Dangerous Drugs 
Act.130 In beginning its analysis, the Federal Court emphasized that all 
constitutional challenges should be interpreted in light of Article 8(1) 
of the Federal Constitution,131 which provides that all persons are 
“entitled to the equal protection of the law.”132 Going further, the 
Federal Court asserted that Article 8(1) “imports the principle of 
substantive proportionality.”133 Then, the Federal Court provided that 
the same sequential proportionality test “lucidly articulated”134 in 
Sivarasa Rasiah135 (and quoted in Azmi bin Sharom) was the proper 
interpretation of proportionality under Article 8(1). The Federal Court 
then signaled its straightforward, firm adherence to sequential 
proportionality when considering constitutional challenges: 
“Accordingly, when any State action is challenged as violating a 
fundamental right, . . . art 8(1) will at once be engaged such that the 
action must meet the test of proportionality.”136 The Federal Court 
then paid homage to the use of proportionality in its sister 
Commonwealth jurisdictions,137 indicating its support for transnational 
judicial dialogue. Alma Nudo referenced the proportionality tests used 
 
 129. See, e.g., Alma Nudo Atenza v. Pub. Prosecutor, [2019] 3 MLRA 1, 32 (Malay.), http://
www.elaw.my/JE/01/JE1_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR2M-5YEC] (“[W]hen any State action is 
challenged as violating a fundamental right, such as the right to life or personal liberty under art 
5(1), art 8(1) will at once be engaged such that the action must meet the [three-step] test of 
proportionality.”); Nik Nazmi bin Nik Ahmad v. Pub. Prosecutor, [2014] 4 MLJ 157, 172 (Malay.), 
http://www.janablegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Nik-Nazmi-Nik-Ahmad-v-PP.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/HG6C-5KMS] (citing to Canada’s sequential proportionality test with approval and 
applying a proportionality principle as part of a broader reasonableness test). 
 130. Alma Nudo, [2019] 3 MLRA at 6. More specifically, the defendants contested the 
statute’s conflation of drug trafficking with drug possession. Section 37 of the statute allowed the 
government to charge individuals with trafficking merely by proving their custody and control 
over the particular controlled substance. Id. at 26. Among other constitutional violations, the 
defendants argued that this provision violated their right to a presumption of innocence under 
Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution. Id.  
 131. Id. at 31. 
 132. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, Nov. 1, 2010, art. 8(1) (Malay.). 
 133. Alma Nudo, [2019] 3 MLRA at 31. 
 134. Id. at 32. 
 135. Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malay., [2010] 2 MLJ 333, 350 (Malay.), 
https://www.slideshare.net/surrenderyourthrone/sivarasa-v-badan-peguam-malaysia?from_action 
=save [https://perma.cc/D5DZ-A2BF]. 
 136. Alma Nudo, [2019] 3 MLRA at 32.  
 137. Id.  
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in a few jurisdictions, including the “[u]seful guidance” of Canada’s test 
in Oakes in particular.138  
Then, the Federal Court applied each step of the test to § 37A of 
the Dangerous Drugs Act, the statutory provision challenged by the 
defendants.139 First, the Federal Court considered the government’s 
objectives for the law—targeting the country’s drug-trafficking 
problem—and deemed it a “sufficiently important objective”140 
meriting application of the remainder of the proportionality test. Then, 
the Federal Court considered whether a “rational nexus” existed 
between the law and the objective, holding it was “at least arguable 
that the resulting ease of securing convictions [wa]s rationally 
connected to the aim of curbing the vice of drug trafficking.”141 
Nevertheless, the Federal Court found that the law failed the third 
stage of the test, proportionality, underlining that “any restriction of 
fundamental rights does not only require a legitimate objective, but 
must be proportionate to the importance of the right at stake.”142  
Alma Nudo represents the Federal Court’s affirmation of 
proportionality principles through its articulation and complete 
application of the sequential proportionality test.143 A Malaysian court 
considering a renewed challenge under the Sedition Act could follow 
Alma Nudo’s reasoning as a template. Using Alma Nudo’s framework 
against the backdrop presumption of constitutionality,144 the Federal 
Court could consider the colonial legacy of the law in all three prongs 
of the Sivarasa test.145 First, the Federal Court could scrutinize the 
government’s objectives under part (a) of the test or in its analysis of 
part (b), which asks whether the law has a “rational nexus”146 to the 
 
 138. Id. at 34. 
 139. Id. at 38–39.  
 140. Id. at 38. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 39. Specifically, the Court found that the law’s system of presumptions provided 
for trafficking convictions based on a presumption of possession, rather than proof of possession, 
amounting to a “harsh and oppressive” regime that imposed an “unacceptably severe incursion 
into the right of the accused under art 5(1) . . . disproportionate to the aim of curbing crime.” Id. 
at 40. 
 143. Id. at 38–39.  
 144. Pub. Prosecutor v. Azmi Sharom, [2015] 8 CLJ 921, 937 (Malay.), https://www.malikimtiaz. 
com.my/doc/azmi-sharom.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HAL-VQMC].  
 145. Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malay., [2010] 2 MLJ 333, 350 (Malay.), 
https://www.slideshare.net/surrenderyourthrone/sivarasa-v-badan-peguam-malaysia?from_action 
=save [https://perma.cc/D5DZ-A2BF]. 
 146. Id. 
KANNA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020  12:52 PM 
2020 FURTHERING DECOLONIZATION 435 
objective. Finally, the Federal Court could of course include colonial 
legacy in its analysis of the law’s ultimate proportionality, which 
constitutes part (c) of the test. Importantly, the Malaysian articulation 
of the test differs from the Canadian test in a key respect: the 
government must articulate a “rational nexus” between the law and its 
objective, rather than showing that it is the “least restrictive means.”147 
Nevertheless, in Alma Nudo, the Court indicated that a consideration 
of whether the law is the least restrictive means could fit in the 
proportionality prong of the test, thus highlighting some flexibility in 
the test’s application.148 
Assessing a challenge to the Sedition Act, the Federal Court could 
first ask whether the government had a “sufficiently important”149 
objective to justify infringing the freedoms of speech, assembly, and 
association under Article 10 of the Constitution. The government 
could likely justify the Sedition Act as a permissible restriction “in the 
interest of the security of the Federation,”150 or as necessary to the 
“public order or morality.”151 However, the Federal Court could 
inquire into the law’s use as a tool of colonial control to take a deeper 
look at its underlying purposes: quashing political dissent as a means 
to shore up the government’s power. Assessing the roots of the law 
would thus reveal an inconsistency in the allegedly benign objectives 
of protecting national security and the public order. By considering the 
law’s colonial origins, the court could account for the historical 
underpinnings of the law, enacted during a period of foreign control 
when Great Britain stripped the local population of its ability to self-
govern. Nevertheless, given that laws rarely fail to pass this threshold 
question in countries that regularly employ a proportionality test, the 
law’s colonial legacy might be more potent at the second step of the 
proportionality inquiry. 
 
 147. Compare Alma Nudo, [2019] 3 MLR at 38 (asking merely whether a “rational nexus” 
exists between the rights restriction and the stated objective), with R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 
103, 106 (Can.) (asking whether the law “impair[s] the right in question as little as possible”). 
 148. See Alma Nudo, [2019] 3 MLR at 40 (finding the law was disproportionate in part 
because “[i]t is far from clear that the objective cannot be achieved through other means less 
damaging to the accused’s fundamental right under art 5”). 
 149. Sivarasa Rasiah, [2010] 2 MLJ at 350.  
 150. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, Nov. 1, 2010, art. 10(2)(a) (Malay.). 
 151. Id.; see also Goodroad, supra note 84, at 278 (“National security and public order are 
other methods that have repeatedly been used to limit free speech in . . . Malaysia.”). 
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That second step considers whether the rights restriction has a 
“rational nexus”152 with the government’s stated objective. Here, the 
Federal Court could again assess the colonial legacy of the law as 
indicative of its irrationality. Again, the law’s colonial justification as 
an instrument to control anticolonial dissenters would be instructive. 
In recent years, the now-former Prime Minister similarly used the 
sedition law to clamp down on political dissidence in response to his 
administration’s declining popularity.153 The Sedition Act’s use to 
restrict political dissent erodes the “nexus” between the law and the 
government’s stated objective. Political dissent is a natural feature of 
democratic systems like Malaysia, and the Constitution’s protections 
of freedoms like that of free speech and expression underscore the 
nation’s fundamental adherence to principles of pluralism, tolerance, 
and self-government. Using the colonial origins of a law as a cudgel to 
silence political activists highlights colonialism’s longstanding status as 
a tool of social control. Even so, the second prong of the test articulated 
in Sivarasa and applied in Alma Nudo is not strictly a “least restrictive 
means” test like the second prong of Canada’s proportionality test.154 
While this likely would make it more difficult to overcome the Federal 
Court’s presumption of constitutionality, the Federal Court could 
consider whether the law poses the least restrictive impairment of the 
right in its discussion of proportionality, as in Alma Nudo.155 Despite 
this difficulty, considering colonial legacy would still strengthen 
challenges to colonial laws like the Sedition Act. Moreover, the 
Federal Court can consider all these elements under the third prong of 
the test, which asks whether the rights restriction is proportionate. 
Because of the proportionality inquiry’s flexibility and breadth, the 
Court may exercise its independent judgment of the case’s merits.156 
A difficulty with this approach is that under Article 10 of the 
Malaysian Constitution, the Court is not permitted to inquire as to the 
“reasonableness” of a law.157 Indeed, Malaysian courts have noted that 
 
 152. Alma Nudo, [2019] 3 MLR at 38. 
 153. See LAKHDHIR, supra note 74, at 4 (describing increased crackdowns on free speech in 
light of rising public discontent toward the government in the late 2010s).  
 154. See supra note 147. 
 155. See Alma Nudo, [2019] 3 MLR at 40. 
 156. See Jackson, supra note 90, at 3099 (identifying the third “proportionality” prong of the 
sequential test as a place where courts exercise “independent judicial evaluation”). 
 157. See Pub. Prosecutor v. Azmi Sharom, [2015] 8 CLJ 921, 940 (Malay.), 
https://www.malikimtiaz.com.my/doc/azmi-sharom.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HAL-VQMC] (declining 
to adopt the “reasonableness test” to consider the validity of challenges under Article 10). 
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Article 10(2), the limitations clause, does not contemplate 
“reasonable” restrictions on the freedoms of expression, assembly, and 
association.158 However, this difficulty is not insurmountable. Although 
an assessment of a law’s “reasonableness” is often a feature of 
proportionality tests,159 it is far too literal to decline to apply 
proportionality principles simply because a limitations clause does not 
explicitly require reasonable limitations. In fact, despite its refusal to 
assess the “reasonableness” of the Sedition Act, the Court in Azmi bin 
Sharom confirmed that “[t]he restriction that may be imposed by the 
Legislature under art. 10(2) is not without limit.”160 And given the 
particularized facts of each case, the Federal Court’s consideration of 
colonial legacy would, at the very least, cast doubt on the veracity of 
the government’s objectives and aid the Court in its ability to correctly 
identify the extent of the law’s restriction of Article 10 freedoms.161 
III.  THE ROLE OF COURTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
NONSEQUENTIAL PROPORTIONALITY 
Sequential proportionality is not the only proportionality 
framework used in the Commonwealth. Courts in other 
Commonwealth countries, like South Africa, use a “global 
proportionality test”162—sometimes referred to as a nonsequential 
proportionality test—which lacks the structure and sequence of 
Canada’s test. This Part first provides an analysis of nonsequential 
proportionality using South Africa’s test as a model. Then, it analyzes 
the High Court of Kenya’s decision upholding the country’s colonial-
 
 158. Id. (contrasting Article 10(2) with the analogous Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution, 
which stipulates “reasonable restriction[s],” and noting that Article 10’s legislative history 
suggests that the term “reasonable” was deliberately omitted). 
 159. See generally Sweet & Mathews, Proportionality Balancing, supra note 88 (describing 
proportionality tests as balancing tests where “reasonableness” is often synonymous with 
necessity or least-restrictive-means analyses).  
 160. Azmi Sharom, [2015] 8 CLJ at 923.  
 161. To caveat, this Note acknowledges the recent political unease in Malaysia. In 2018, the 
Pakatan Harapan, a center-left, reform-oriented coalition, ousted the long-ruling, rightwing 
Barisan Nasional party. Jonathan Head, How Malaysia’s Government Collapsed in Two Years, 
BBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51716474 [https://perma.cc/
8U55-SDDB]. In March 2020, however, following a short period of turmoil, the Pakatan Harapan 
party was replaced in power after losing its majority in parliament. Id. The Barisan Nasional has 
regained its majority. Id. Given the nascence of the new ruling coalition, it is unclear whether or 
how this transition will affect the courts. Id.  
 162. Niels Petersen, Proportionality and the Incommensurability Challenge in the 
Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court, 30 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 405, 428 
(2014).  
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era sodomy law163 and argues that the case may have turned out 
differently if the High Court had employed a proportionality test that 
considered the colonial origins of the law. Finally, given the Supreme 
Court of India’s recent invalidation of a sodomy law164 and the 
increasing prominence of India’s jurisprudence,165 this Part briefly 
forecasts the use of nonsequential proportionality with respect to 
India’s colonial-era sedition law, which remains a source of great 
controversy.166  
A. Nonsequential Proportionality: South Africa’s “Balancing 
Exercise” 
Like Canada’s, South Africa’s Constitution also contains a 
limitations clause.167 The South African Supreme Court has, however, 
eschewed the use of a sequential proportionality test, opting instead to 
use a multifactor balancing test to interpret some constitutional 
rights.168 In S v. Manamela,169 the South African Court described its 
proportionality standard as follows:  
It should be noted that the five factors expressly itemised in [the 
limitations clause] are not presented as an exhaustive list. They are 
included in the section as key factors that have to be considered in an 
overall assessment as to whether or not the limitation is reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society. In essence, the 
Court must engage in a balancing exercise and arrive at a global 
 
 163. EG v. Att’y Gen. (2019) K.L.R. 1 (H.C.K.) (Kenya), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/ 
173946 [https://perma.cc/6G3U-SYWV].  
 164. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 112 (India), 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/119980704 [https://perma.cc/4U6W-V39P]. 
 165. Jeffrey Gettleman, Hari Kumar & Kai Schultz, Hundreds of Cases a Day and a Flair for 
Drama: India’s Crusading Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2NMxDqU  
[https://perma.cc/F7QW-RXHX]. 
 166. Use and Misuse of Sedition Law: Section 124A of IPC, INDIA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/use-and-misuse-of-sedition-
law-section-124a-of-ipc-divd-1607533-2019-10-09 [https://perma.cc/JAM4-YYTJ]. 
 167. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 36(1) (“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in 
terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors . . . .”).  
 168. Katherine G. Young, Proportionality, Reasonableness, and Economic and Social Rights, 
in PROPORTIONALITY: NEW FRONTIERS, NEW CHALLENGES 248, 256–60 (Vicki C. Jackson & 
Mark Tushnet eds., 2017).  
 169. S v. Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 29 para. 32 (S. Afr.), https://collections.concourt.
org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/2070/Full%20judgment%20(538%20Kb)-1478.pdf?sequence= 
1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/T6WN-RTAQ].  
KANNA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020  12:52 PM 
2020 FURTHERING DECOLONIZATION 439 
judgment on proportionality and not adhere mechanically to a 
sequential check-list.170 
The Court explicitly repudiated the Canadian-style sequential 
proportionality test, instead preferring a “global judgment” to a 
“sequential check-list.”171  
The South African test favors multifactor balancing based on the 
recognition that “[t]he fact that different rights have different 
implications for democracy . . . means that there is no absolute 
standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and 
necessity.”172 Given these differences, the Court considers the 
following factors as relevant to the balancing test:  
[T]he nature of the right that is limited, and its importance to an open 
and democratic society based on freedom and equality; the purpose 
for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to 
such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy, and 
particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the 
desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less 
damaging to the right in question.173 
These factors overlap with the different steps of the sequential test. 
The Court first looks to the “purpose for which the right is limited,” as 
the Canadian courts look for a “sufficiently important” purpose, then 
the Court looks at whether “means less damaging” could be pursued 
to achieve the purpose, as the Canadian courts look for “minimal 
impairment.”174 The difference, however, is that the South African 
Court does not consider these elements in a particular order, and no 
single factor is dispositive.175 Nevertheless, the South African Court has 
extensively referenced Canada’s proportionality jurisprudence,176 
 
 170. Id. at 29 para. 32.  
 171. Id. 




 173. Id. 
 174. Compare id. at 436 para. 104, 438 para. 107 (setting out the factors of South Africa’s 
global balancing test), with R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103, 105–06 (Can.) (articulating the 
paradigmatic three-step sequential proportionality test). 
 175. See Sweet & Mathews, Proportionality Balancing, supra note 88, at 129 (noting that the 
South African proportionality test is “not always conducted in a sequence of discrete steps”). 
 176. Kevin Iles, A Fresh Look at Limitations: Unpacking Section 36, 23 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 
68, 69 (2007).  
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juxtaposing the noncategorical nature of the multifactor, 
nonsequential balancing test with the prevalence of transnational 
judicial dialogue in the Commonwealth. 
A court using a nonsequential proportionality test like South 
Africa’s while considering the validity of a colonial-era law could 
consider the law’s colonial legacy as illuminative of its purpose. A court 
could also consider whether the colonial legacy of the challenged law 
was inherently antithetical to the nature of the constitutional right in 
question, such as the rights to freedom of expression and association or 
the rights to privacy and equal treatment under the law. Given the 
nonsequential test’s non-exhaustive, flexible nature, a court employing 
it could theoretically decide to consider a law’s colonial legacy as an 
independent factor and thus invalidate a law based on the implications 
of its colonial legacy alone. Because the nonsequential test is not 
exhaustive, it allows courts to cater their analysis to the particular facts 
of each case. Perhaps a court would decide the nature of the right 
implicated is so important that any limitation not formulated and 
implemented by an elected, independent, native government is invalid. 
Regardless of the factor used to consider colonial legacy, the element 
of control—the moral and physical control inherent in many colonial-
era criminal laws—would be the relevant takeaway. 
B. Kenya and the Potential for Proportionality: EG Re-examined 
Kenya’s Constitution contains a limitations clause177 closely 
reminiscent of South Africa’s, providing that “[a] right or fundamental 
freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and 
then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society.”178 The Kenyan limitations clause 
also sets forth factors, similar to those in the South African global 
balancing test, to be considered in light of any limitation.179 These 
strong similarities are not accidental. Kenya’s constitutional drafting 
process was influenced by South Africa’s post-apartheid experience, 
 
 177. CONSTITUTION, art. 24 (2010) (Kenya). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Compare id. (considering “the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; . . . the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation; . . . the nature and extent of the limitation; . . . the 
relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose,” among other factors), with S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 36(1) (considering “all 
relevant factors,” including “the nature of the right,” “the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation,” “the nature and extent of the limitation,” “the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose,” and “less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”). 
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and provisions of Kenya’s Bill of Rights, including its limitations 
clause, were significantly borrowed from South Africa’s Constitution 
and jurisprudence.180 Although the two provisions are not identical,181 
the striking similarities they share furnish the Kenyan courts with the 
opportunity to mirror the South African approach to judicial review of 
rights limitations. South Africa’s global balancing test would be a 
particularly workable method of constitutional interpretation in the 
Kenyan context and had the High Court of Kenya applied this test in 
its recent decision upholding the country’s sodomy law,182 the High 
Court may have reached a different result. 
In EG v. Attorney General,183 decided in May 2019,184 the High 
Court of Kenya ultimately upheld the sodomy law despite challenges 
based on the petitioners’ constitutional rights to equality,185 human 
dignity,186 and privacy,187 among others.188 The High Court’s decision 
hinged on its interpretation of Article 45(2) of the Constitution, which 
recognizes the “right to marry a person of the opposite sex, based on 
the free consent of the parties.”189 Focusing on the provision’s 
protection of the right to marry someone of the “opposite sex,” the 
High Court reasoned that the country’s criminalization of homosexual 
conduct did not violate the petitioners rights to human dignity and 
privacy, and it expressly declined to address whether the limitation was 
 
 180. Jill Cottrell Ghai & Yash Ghai, The Contribution of the South African Constitution to 
Kenya’s Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL TRIUMPHS, CONSTITUTIONAL DISAPPOINTMENTS: A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 1996 SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION’S LOCAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE 252, 255 (Rosalind Dixon & Theunis Roux eds., 2018). 
 181. See id. at 261 (pointing out that Kenya’s limitations clause, in § 24(1)(d), considers “the 
need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not 
prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others,” whereas South Africa’s limitations 
clause does not).  
 182. EG v. Att’y Gen. (2019) K.L.R. 1, 56 (H.C.K.) (Kenya), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/ 
view/173946 [https://perma.cc/PV26-ZBW2].  
 183. EG v. Att’y Gen. (2019) K.L.R. 1, 56 (H.C.K.) (Kenya), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/ 
view/173946 [https://perma.cc/PV26-ZBW2].  
 184. Id. at 1. 
 185. CONSTITUTION, art. 27 (2010) (Kenya). 
 186. Id. art. 28. 
 187. Id. art. 31. 
 188. See EG, (2019) K.L.R. at 29 (listing other allegedly violated rights and freedoms, 
including the freedom of conscience, religion, belief, and opinion; the right to health; and the right 
to fair hearing). 
 189. CONSTITUTION,  art. 45(2) (2010) (Kenya). 
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“reasonable and justifiable”190 in light of Article 24.191 The High Court 
rendered its judgment despite the petitioners’ explicit indications that 
they did not seek to legalize same-sex marriage but merely sought to 
protect their right to conduct themselves in private as they saw fit.192 In 
effect, the High Court found the petitioners’ challenge indirectly 
incompatible with the Constitution—the challenge failed due to the 
Constitution’s affirmative recognition of opposite-sex marriage, 
despite its lack of a provision explicitly prohibiting same-sex marriage. 
The High Court then went further, finding that “[same-sex] 
relationships, whether in private or not, formal or not would be in 
violation of the tenor and spirit of the Constitution.”193 This assertion 
is particularly extraordinary in light of the Kenyan Constitution’s 
“transformative” approach to civil and political, as well as economic, 
social, and cultural, rights.194 In EG, the High Court’s reasoning 
allowed the constitutional recognition of opposite-sex marriage to 
trump the many other constitutional rights the petitioners asserted.  
Although the Kenyan High Court referenced analogous case law 
in other Commonwealth countries,195 the High Court failed to 
scrutinize the government’s objectives for the sodomy law and to ask 
whether it was a valid limitation under Article 24. Had the High Court 
employed a global balancing test to do this, it may have reached the 
opposite result. Although the High Court referenced the colonial 
origin of the law,196 it did not discuss it further. Nevertheless, the High 
Court opined that the Kenya Constitution is “a mirror reflecting the 
national soul, the identification of the ideals and aspirations of the 
nation.”197 As a result, the court continued, “[t]he spirit and tenor of 
the Constitution must therefore preside and permeate the process of 
judicial interpretation and judicial discretion.”198 Under a 
proportionality test, the High Court could inquire into the 
government’s purposes for limiting the petitioners’ rights to privacy 
 
 190. EG, (2019) K.L.R. at 54. 
 191. Id. at 55. 
 192. Id. at 10. 
 193. Id. at 55. 
 194. See Ghai & Ghai, supra note 180, at 256 (noting that the Kenyan Constitution is “readily 
identifiable as [a] ‘transformative constitution[]’”).  
 195. See EG, (2019) K.L.R. at 49–52 (reviewing caselaw overturning sodomy laws in India, 
South Africa, Botswana, the United States, and elsewhere).  
 196. Id. at 30. 
 197. Id. at 53. 
 198. Id. 
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and human dignity, and in so doing, it would have to contend with the 
fundamental incompatibility of a colonial law with the values reflecting 
the “national soul.”199 Indeed, the soul of many postcolonial nations—
including Kenya—is reflected in the pluralistic, democratic ideals 
enshrined in their constitutions, ideals inconsistent with the sodomy 
laws and other colonial-era criminal laws used to control and repress 
the colonized populace. 
Going further, the High Court would consider the nature of the 
restricted rights and would likely recognize that the rights to human 
dignity and privacy are among the most fundamental protections under 
the Constitution. In its opinion, the High Court asserted that “[t]he 
Constitution gives prominence to national values and principles of 
governance which include human dignity, equity, social justice, 
inclusiveness, equality, [and] human rights . . . .”200 Considering the 
law’s colonial legacy would likely increase the High Court’s level of 
scrutiny by focusing its attention on the law’s original purpose and its 
highly discriminatory implementation. In the opinion, the High Court 
dismissed the petitioners’ arguments under Article 27, which enshrines 
equal treatment under the law, because the latter did not provide an 
“iota of evidence . . . to establish any of the cited acts of 
discrimination.”201 If the High Court had considered the law’s colonial 
legacy as reflective of its roots in social control and subjugation, it may 
have adopted a less rigid stance toward the petitioners’ equal-
treatment claims. While the High Court pronounced that “the 
Constitution must not be interpreted in a ‘narrow, mechanistic, rigid 
and artificial’”202 fashion, its decision to uphold the law by stressing the 
incompatibility of homosexual conduct with the provision recognizing 
opposite-sex marriage had precisely these failings. By using a 
proportionality test that considered the law’s colonial legacy, the High 
Court would have better fulfilled its role as a “guardian of the 
constitution.”203  
Reflecting on the relics of colonialism still present in his country, 
the Kenyan writer Mukoma Wa Ngugi said, “The British empire in one 
sense ended, but its language is now the language of the world.”204 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
 201. Id. at 42. 
 202. Id. at 53. 
 203. Juma & Okpaluba, supra note 15, at 288. 
 204. Kushner, supra note 52. 
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Colonial laws that remain in place are persistent reminders of the 
continuing repercussions of colonialism in postcolonial societies. In 
Kenya, and elsewhere in the Commonwealth, courts have the 
responsibility to assess the validity of these laws under the 
Constitution. A proportionality test that factors in colonial origins may 
help courts dismantle this enduring legacy of control and develop a 
rights jurisprudence that is more protective of the fundamental rights 
enshrined in postcolonial constitutions.  
C. Nonsequential Proportionality in India: A Further Avenue for 
Reform 
India’s Supreme Court is well known in the Commonwealth both 
for its activist approach to rights protection and for its analytically rich 
jurisprudence.205 Indeed, in 2018, India’s Supreme Court made history 
in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India206 when it invalidated the 
country’s sodomy law. This decision vindicated a decades’ long fight 
for LGBTQ+ equality and recognized the privacy and equality rights 
of millions of Indian citizens.207 At the same time, India was the 
centerpiece of the former British Empire, and it retains many colonial-
era criminal laws that pose human rights challenges, including the 
country’s notorious sedition law.208  
India’s jurisprudence may provide inspiration to courts 
considering how to grapple with a law’s colonial legacy. In its decision 
overturning Section 377, India’s sodomy law, the Indian Supreme 
Court referenced the law’s colonial legacy extensively.209 The Court 
pointedly referred to the law’s foreignness: “A hundred and fifty eight 
years ago, a colonial legislature made it criminal, even for consenting 
 
 205. See Arun Thiruvengadam, The Global Dialogue Among Courts: Social Rights 
Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India from a Comparative Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS, 
JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT 264–309 (C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam 
eds., 2007) (describing India’s extensive engagement in transjudicial dialogue in its rights 
jurisprudence).  
 206. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 1 (India), https://indiankanoon.org/ 
doc/119980704 [https://perma.cc/4U6W-V39P]. 
 207. See id. at 113 (“We further declare that Section 377 insofar as it criminalises homosexual 
sex and transgender sex between consenting adults is unconstitutional.”). 
 208. Ayesha Pattnaik, The Art of Dissolving Dissent: India’s Sedition Law as an Instrument 
To Regulate Public Opinion, S. ASIA @LSE BLOG (Oct. 4, 2019), https://blogs.
lse.ac.uk/southasia/2019/10/04/long-read-the-art-of-dissolving-dissent-indias-sedition-law-as-an-
instrument-to-regulate-public-opinion [https://perma.cc/6XZK-5RPJ]. 
 209. Johar, (2018) 1 SCC at 116. 
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adults of the same gender, to find fulfillment in love.”210 Going further, 
the Court emphasized the conundrum many postcolonial societies 
face—as long as they retain colonial laws, they are tethered to the 
colonial legacy.211 Indeed, the Court found Section 377’s colonial 
history quite instructive to its validity:  
A supposedly alien law, Section 377 has managed to survive for over 
158 years, impervious to both the anticolonial struggle as well as the 
formation of a democratic India, which guarantees fundamental 
rights to all its citizens. An inquiry into the colonial origins of Section 
377 and its postulations about sexuality is useful in assessing the 
relevance of the provision in contemporary times.212 
 
The Indian Supreme Court has experimented with proportionality 
tests but traditionally employs a reasonableness test akin to a 
nonsequential, global balancing test.213 In its consideration of the 
sodomy law, the Court made numerous references to proportionality 
principles and tests used in other Commonwealth and international 
courts,214 and it made analogies to their reasoning to invalidate Section 
377.215 However, the Court’s reasoning in Navtej Singh Johar was not 
structured as a proportionality analysis. Rather, the Court borrowed 
theories and arguments from several different doctrines and paid 
significant attention to other countries’ jurisprudence on sodomy 
laws.216 Nevertheless, its references to proportionality and 
reasonableness make the Indian Supreme Court a natural candidate 
for operationalizing a more formalized nonsequential proportionality 
test. 
Given the Indian Supreme Court’s open acknowledgement of 
colonialism’s problematic influence on postcolonial society, it would be 
 
 210. Id. (emphasis added). 
 211. Id. at 116 (“Eighty seven years after the law was made, India gained her liberation from 
a colonial past. But Macaulays [sic] legacy - the offence under Section 377 of the Penal Code - has 
continued to exist for nearly sixty eight years after we gave ourselves a liberal Constitution.”). 
 212. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
 213. See generally Abhinav Chandrachud, Wednesbury Reformulated, Proportionality and the 
Supreme Court of India, 13 OXFORD UNIV. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 191 (2013) (arguing that 
India’s Supreme Court does not employ a sequential proportionality test but rather a 
reasonableness test). 
 214. Johar, (2018) 1 SCC at 127–29.  
 215. Id. at 63 (“In view of the test laid down in the aforesaid authorities, Section 377 IPC does 
not meet the criteria of proportionality and is violative of the fundamental right of freedom of 
expression including the right to choose a sexual partner.”). 
 216. Id. at 118–45. 
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natural for the Court to consider colonialism as part of its balancing 
test for constitutional challenges to any colonial-era law. The country’s 
sedition law has been the subject of recent criticism, but the 
government has insisted on maintaining its use.217 As a result, the 
Indian court system may very well be activists’ most realistic avenue to 
challenge the law. The courts could consider the country’s sedition law 
in light of its original colonial purposes, as the Court did in Navtej Singh 
Johar for India’s sodomy law.218 Indeed, they could apply many of the 
same arguments this Note raised in connection with Malaysia’s sedition 
law.219 Given the Indian Supreme Court’s influence in the broader 
Commonwealth,220 India could spur a new conversation in 
transnational judicial dialogue by adopting a more explicit and 
consistent consideration of colonialism when considering colonial-era 
laws.  
IV.  COUNTERARGUMENTS: OBSTACLES TO DOCTRINAL REFORM 
While academic critiques of colonialism are widespread, there 
may be more practical roadblocks to operationalizing these critiques in 
the context of judicial review. Many Commonwealth courts have a 
longstanding practice of legislative deference,221 which may limit their 
willingness to do a more searching analysis of a law’s purposes and 
origins. Moreover, courts in jurisdictions that have failed to 
legislatively repeal laws from the colonial era may need to contend with 
arguments that such laws are reflective of local cultural beliefs.222 This 
Part considers each of these contentions and responds to them in turn.  
 
 217. Sedition Law To Stay, Gov’t Says Need To Retain Provision To Fight Anti-National 
Elements, INDIA TODAY (July 3, 2019, 1:20 PM), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/sedition-
law-modi-govt-retain-provision-anti-national-elements-1560982-2019-07-03 [https://perma.cc/HJ3Q- 
GKUJ]. 
 218. Johar, (2018) 1 SCC at 13. 
 219. See infra Part II.B.  
 220. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 829 (2012) (identifying India as one of three constitutional 
systems whose courts are increasing in transnational influence as the United States’ international 
constitutional influence declines). 
 221. See, e.g., Prempeh, supra note 15, at 1256 (describing many postcolonial African courts’ 
historic practice of “deference to the judgment of the dominant politicians of the day”). 
 222. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, THIS ALIEN LEGACY, supra note 6, at 1 (describing the 
Indian Home Ministry’s old defense of Section 377, India’s now-invalid sodomy law, as reflective 
of Indian values and culture).  
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A.  Contending with a Tradition of Legislative Deference: 
A Transnational Approach 
Malaysia’s courts provide a useful example of how politics can 
shape the judiciary and alter its approach to judicial review. In 1988, 
Malaysia experienced a constitutional crisis that dramatically reshaped 
Malaysia’s Federal Court and produced enduring deference to the 
dominant political party.223 In response to a string of judicial 
invalidations of legislative enactments, coupled with a series of 
scandals involving the judiciary,224 the Malaysian government amended 
the Constitution to strip the courts’ absolute power of judicial review 
and instead limited courts to only those “powers as may be conferred 
by or under federal law.”225 In light of this complex political situation, 
the Malaysian judiciary has been relatively deferential in the last few 
decades.226 While the Malaysian courts have recently taken a more 
activist approach in their adoption of proportionality,227 the Malaysian 
experience cautions that changes in the political landscape can have a 
chilling effect on rights-protective judicial review. 
Although courts should respect the separation of powers and 
temper their interference with the province of the political branches, 
they should embrace their status as “guardian[s] of the constitution”228 
and take an active role in ensuring the protection of constitutional 
rights.229 Commonwealth courts can ensure a more stable rights 
jurisprudence by maintaining a transjudicial dialogue with other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions.230 For example, Professor Li-ann Thio 
claims that “resort to foreign jurisdictions and international law”231 
 
 223. See generally A. J. Harding, The 1988 Constitutional Crisis in Malaysia, 39 INT’L & 
COMPAR. L.Q. 57 (1990) (providing a contemporary account of the crisis and describing its impact 
on the Malaysian judiciary). 
 224. Id. 
 225. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, Nov. 1, 2010, art. 121(1) (Malay.). 
 226. Yvonne Tew, Malaysia, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
ASIA (David Law, Holning Lau & Alex Schwartz eds., Oxford Univ. Press forthcoming 2021).  
 227. See supra Part II.B. 
 228. Juma & Okpaluba, supra note 15, at 288. 
 229. See Jackson, supra note 90, at 3154 (“[W]hile legislatures and executives may have 
particular knowledge and competence about, for example, the scope of national security risks and 
the best means to minimize those risks, courts have more capacity fairly to decide questions of 
individual rights.”); Sweet & Mathews, Proportionality Balancing, supra note 88, at 84 (describing 
arguments that the risks of judicial lawmaking are a “reasonable . . . price to pay for obtaining 
some greater social benefit,” like “protecting rights”). 
 230. See Thio, supra note 15, at 501. 
 231. Id. 
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among Malaysian and Singaporean courts has “aided in the progressive 
development of jurisprudence, particularly with respect to novel 
areas”232 of law. The Commonwealth, with over fifty members,233 
simultaneously features a wide range of cultural, political, and 
economic experiences and has a mutual basis in the English common 
law. While this Note highlights some of the chief problems with the 
colonial experience, the Commonwealth’s shared colonial history has 
its positives. As each member of the Commonwealth moves on its own 
trajectory toward realizing human rights, members can look to each 
other for inspiration and judicial expertise when deciding challenges to 
colonial-era, human-rights-infringing laws. 
B. Balancing Adherence with Local Values and Custom 
In its decision to uphold Kenya’s sodomy law, the Kenyan High 
Court appeared to sympathize with respondents’ and interested 
parties’ appeals to religion, morality, and public opinion as justification 
for the law.234 Indeed, supporters of such laws often appeal to tradition 
and conservative social values in arguing for the laws’ continued 
force.235 Where colonial-era laws target minority groups but 
nevertheless enjoy majoritarian support, courts should give even 
greater heed to arguments highlighting the colonial origins and colonial 
purposes of the law. Given the political-process failures involved with 
ensuring minority representation, courts are often the only place where 
such groups are able to make their voices heard. The doctrinal changes 
proposed by this Note speak to this problem directly. A careful and 
intentional analysis of a law’s colonial origins that incorporates 
awareness of the continued process of decolonization will help guard 
against the deference to public opinion and majoritarianism that the 
Kenyan High Court unfortunately employed in its decision to uphold 
the sodomy law.236 When a Commonwealth court considers the original 
purposes for such colonial criminal laws, it will need to confront the 
reality that such laws were designed by a foreign power to control the 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. About Us, supra note 2.  
 234. EG v. Att’y Gen. (2019) K.L.R. 1, 55 (H.C.K.) (Kenya), http://kenyalaw.org/
caselaw/cases/view/173946 [https://perma.cc/7YPS-ZQQ3] (“In our humble view, the desire of 
Kenyans, whether majoritarian or otherwise are reflected in the Constitution.”). 
 235. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, THIS ALIEN LEGACY, supra note 6, at 23 (arguing that “[d]espite 
the claims of modern political leaders that anti-sodomy laws represent the values of their 
independent nations,” the laws further entrench colonial values). 
 236. EG, (2019) K.L.R. at 55. 
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citizenry the court is constitutionally mandated to protect. Such a 
doctrinal adjustment will help to temper the misguided notion that 
colonial-era criminal laws are somehow the product of local traditions 
and values.  
CONCLUSION 
Colonial-era criminal laws are a stark reminder of colonialism’s 
continuing influence on the postcolonial world. Their persistence is 
even more striking given their impact on human rights. In the words of 
Professor Margaret Burnham, this impact “illustrates the absurd 
results that can occur when independent states are still tethered to 
colonial laws that have been discarded as unjust by the colonial power 
itself.”237 The doctrinal modifications proposed by this Note, if 
adopted, may not result in the wholesale invalidation of such laws. 
Indeed, consideration of colonial legacy is one of many different 
elements a court should entertain when evaluating a constitutional 
challenge to a sodomy, sedition, or other colonial criminal law. 
Nevertheless, greater judicial appreciation of postcolonial dynamics 
will only strengthen the rigor of constitutional jurisprudence in the 
Commonwealth and beyond. Further research opportunities abound, 
including an analysis of how proportionality principles vary across the 
Commonwealth, a deeper dive into how culture and politics shape and 
challenge the process of postcolonial judicial review, or how 
postcolonial civil law systems (such as former French colonies) could 
incorporate an analogous doctrinal test more suitable for civil law 
jurisdictions. The process of decolonization that began in the mid-
twentieth century is ongoing and multifaceted, and the judiciary should 
not hesitate to advance it.  
 
 
 237. See Burnham, supra note 11, at 252.  
